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Abstract 
Principal-agent relationships in bidding firms are widespread in high-stakes auctions. 
Often only the agent has information about the value of the objects being sold. The 
board wants to maximize the profit, but the management wants to win the package with 
the highest value. In environments in which it is efficient for firms to coordinate on 
jointly winning packages, we show that the principals would coordinate, while the 
agents would not. We analyze environments with decreasing levels of information that 
the principal has about the valuations. Depending on the auction format it can be 
impossible to set budget constraints that align the agents’ strategies in equilibrium. The 
analysis helps explain price wars in high-stakes auctions. 
Keywords:  Auction, Electronic Marketplace, Principal-Agent Model 
Introduction 
The IS literature has always been concerned with models about bidder behavior on markets. Many IS 
contributions have analyzed behavior in online or multi-item auctions that deviate from traditional game-
theoretical assumptions (Adomavicius and Gupta 2005; Bapna et al. 2000; Bapna et al. 2003). The design 
of markets and the development of adequate market models has become a significant IS research stream  
contributing to the interdisciplinary field of market design (Roth 2008), a field that was honored with the 
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2012. In this paper, we suggest to modify a fundamental 
assumption in traditional models of auctions, that of a single payoff-maximizing bidder. This assumption 
has been central for the entire literature on market design in IS and beyond.  
Payoff maximization with quasilinear utility functions is a standard assumption in auction theory that 
allows for dominant strategy incentive compatibility via the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves 
mechanism. Unfortunately, the assumption of a quasilinear utility function is often violated in the field. In 
particular, budget constraints have received significant attention in recent years (Brusco and Lopomo 
2009; Burkett 2015; Che and Gale 2000; Dobzinski et al. 2012; Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1987; Malakhov and 
Vohra 2008; Shapiro et al. 2013). Typically, the literature assumes exogenous budget constraints often 
motivated as the result of imperfect capital markets and agency problems (Che and Gale 1998). Indeed, 
principal-agent relationships are widespread in bidding firms participating in high-stakes auctions. 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1987) discusses such relationships with regard to the auctions of mineral leases, 
defense systems, and construction contracts. It is also well-known that such relationships between the 
supervisory board and the bidding team or management of a telecom play an important role in spectrum 
auctions (Chakravorti et al. 1995; Shapiro et al. 2013).  
We model a related but complementary environment with multi-unit auctions and focus on hidden 
information about the valuations in symmetric principal-agent pairings. In this model, agents have 
precise information about the valuations of the goods, but principals do not. Unlike Burkett (2015), the 
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types of manipulation for agents in multi-object auctions are quite different to single-dimensional 
environments which leads to different types of inefficiency. We show that the information asymmetry and 
the different preferences result in an agency dilemma that is difficult to resolve. 
Information Asymmetries in the Bidding Firm 
Let us first motivate the information asymmetries in principal-agent relationships of bidding firms by 
looking at the relationship between the supervisory board (principal) and the management (agent) of a 
telecom in spectrum auctions. Similar relationships arise between the management of a multinational 
telecom and the management of a national subsidiary bidding in the auction. The payments made by 
telecommunication firms in spectrum auctions are often billions of dollars, and thus the management 
cannot cover the cost of the auction. The agent in these environments has limited liability and the 
principal has to pay in the auction. 
In spectrum auctions, firms have preferences over different packages of spectrum licenses. Each of these 
packages can be assigned a business case with a net present value. The management knows the market 
best, it knows the technology, the competition, and the end consumer market, and so they can compute 
business cases that allow for a good estimate of the net present value of each package. The board of 
directors does not have this information, and the management has no incentive to reveal it. Principals 
cannot force agents to be truthful and often only have analyst estimates that typically have an enormous 
variance. Bulow et al. (2009) writes that “Prior to the AWS auction, analyst estimates of auction revenue 
ranged from $7 to $15 billion. For the recent 700 MHz auction, they varied over an enormous range – 
from $10 to $30 billion.” This is by no means an exception and estimates of investment banks and other 
external observers can be quite different from the actual revenue of the auction.1 Sometimes external 
consultants are hired to provide the principal with more information about the value of the licenses.  
In our model, the agent is not a shareholder of the company and does not internalize the price in his 
utility function. The shares for the management would need to be significant to set profit-maximizing 
incentives in our scenario, thus making the agent a shareholder is not a viable option. He wants to win 
packages with high values because he indirectly benefits from the respective large business cases. For 
example if the management acquires more valuable spectrum at a lower profit, it would be in a better 
strategic position in the local market. Furthermore, the value of the local subsidiary within the 
multinational increases and gives the local management more weight. Empire-building motives are a 
widespread reason for such behavior on the part of agents in the principal-agent literature (Jensen 1986). 
Spectrum auctions are only one example of high-stakes auctions in which such empire-building motives 
matter. Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1987) discusses other auction applications with agency dilemmas and 
writes “in bidding for mineral leases, a firm may wish to maximize expected profits while its bidder feels it 
should maximize the firm's proven reserves.'' Actually, payoff maximization is hard to defend for an agent 
in such high-stakes auctions in which agents typically try to “win within budget.” Contrary, value 
maximization is a good approximation of agent motives.  
The principal would like to maximize profit, but he typically does not have enough information about the 
valuations and the competitors’ preferences to bid on his own. In spectrum auctions, the principal will not 
learn the true valuations of the licenses, as the future profits of the firm depend on many other decisions, 
so that it is also not possible for the principal to understand the impact of winning a specific package in an 
auction ex post. This has also been observed in other markets (Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1987).  
There are a number of parallels to the literature on optimal delegation in which an uninformed principal 
delegates decision rights to an informed but biased agent. Holmström (1977) already showed that the 
optimal mechanism for the principal when utility is not transferable consists of choosing a subset of 
actions, from among which the agent is allowed to pick the most desired one. In our principal-agent 
relationship without asymmetric information in Section “The Limits of Budget Constraints”, we focus on 
delegation sets, in particular, budget constraints as a second-best solution to overcome the agency 
problem and to implement the principal’s equilibrium strategy. Alonso and Matouschek (2008) write that 
“capital budgeting rules typically put limits on the size of the investments that managers can decide on, 
                                                           
1 Prior to the German spectrum auction in 2010, most analysts expected low revenue (Berenberg Bank estimated 
€1.67 bn., the LBBW bank estimated €2.1 bn.). The actual revenue from the auction was €5 bn. 
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but do not link their pay directly to the investments they recommend.” This is similar in spectrum 
auctions.  
Contributions 
We develop a principal-agent model of a firm participating in a multi-unit auction in which the agent has 
hidden information about the valuations of the goods. The principal tries to screen the agent optimally 
with budget constraints to overcome the adverse selection problem arising in this information 
environment.2 We focus on package auctions in our analysis due to their relevance in spectrum auctions 
nowadays and because they allow bidders to express general preferences without presenting an exposure 
problem. For example, France (2011)3 and Norway (2013)4 used a first-price sealed-bid package auction, 
whereas Romania (2012) used an ascending combinatorial clock auction. The ascending package auction 
model can also be seen as an abstraction of the two-stage combinatorial clock auction that has been 
utilized in many countries worldwide (Cramton 2013). Combinatorial auctions have also been used in 
other domains, such as the procurement of bus services for bus routes in London (Cantillon and 
Pesendorfer 2006), of school meals in Chile (Olivares et al. 2012), and of raw materials at Mars, Inc. 
(Bichler et al. 2006).  
Interesting strategic problems of principal-agent relationships within the bidding firms arise in multi-unit 
or more generally multi-object auctions. At this point, there is neither a Bayesian Nash equilibrium 
analysis of wide-spread multi-unit auction formats nor of multi-unit package auction formats when 
bidders have general valuations. In our environment, however, we can derive Bayesian Nash equilibria for 
quasi-linear principals in the package auction which also makes a contribution to the literature on 
package auctions.                                         
First, in the next section we describe the environment formally as the principal-agent  × 		package 
auction model in which n bidders compete for m units of a homogeneous good.  
Next, in Section “The Agency Dilemma” we analyze the different auction formats as Bayesian games in 
order to analyze the agency problems that arise. The pivotal example is a 2 × 2 package auction with two 
units and two bidders in which it is ex-ante common knowledge that the solution with both bidders 
winning one unit each is efficient. In many auction markets, bidders actually have a good understanding 
about the type of efficiency in a market, and we refer to this environment as dual-winner efficiency 
(DWE). We emphasize this environment in the article over other efficiency environments not only 
because it is practically relevant but because it highlights the pivotal strategic problem in the principal-
agent 2 × 2	package auction model: bidding firms need to coordinate in the efficient solution, but agents 
do not, leading to an agency dilemma and inefficiency. It is also straightforward to find similar strategic 
situations in larger markets in which a bidder could win a larger, more valuable package by not bidding on 
a smaller package. Such problems only arise in multi-object auctions, but not in single-object markets.  
To demonstrate the agency bias in the symmetric information environment, we derive equilibrium 
bidding strategies of value-maximizing agents, and show that the agent does not bid on a single-unit 
package in the unique ex-post Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium bidding strategy is independent of the 
package auction format. The result is surprising because in equilibrium there is a risk that the agent will 
win nothing. It is also independent of the efficiency in the market and the risk attitude of the agent.  
Then we analyze the equilibrium bidding strategies of quasilinear principals in case they had exact 
information about the valuations of the firm and their prior distributions. Given ex-ante common 
knowledge about the DWE environment of the bidders, we can derive equilibrium bidding strategies. We 
show that coordination on the dual-winner outcome actually constitutes a Bayesian Nash equilibrium for 
a risk-neutral principal in a first-price sealed-bid package auction, and we characterize environments in 
                                                           
2 Che and Gale (1998) identify moral hazard as a reason for the use of budget constraints to incentivize purchasing 
departments in organizations. Our results also hold in a hidden action environment in which the principal sets a 
budget constraint as a function of the valuations, but cannot observe bids. 
3 http://www.arcep.fr/fileadmin/reprise/dossiers/4G/proj-dec-appel-800mhz-160511.pdf 
4 http://eng.nkom.no/technical/frequency-auctions/auctions/planned-completed-auctions/_attachment/9106 
 A Principal-Agent Model of Bidding Firms 
  
 Thirty Seventh International Conference on Information Systems, Dublin 2016 4 
which the dual-winner equilibrium is payoff-dominant for the principal compared to a single-winner 
equilibrium. A similar result, an ex-post equilibrium to coordinate, is provided for the ascending package 
auction. As a consequence, we have adverse selection in our principal agent model. 
In Section “The Limits of Budget Constraints” we analyze the possibilities for the principal to implement 
his equilibrium strategy with a delegation set, i.e., budgets constraining the agent. One might think that 
whether the principal can implement his strategy with the agent or not crucially depends on the level of 
information he has about the valuations. If the principal knew the valuations ex interim, one might think 
that he can always dictate the agent his equilibrium bids in order to coordinate with other firms on a dual-
winner outcome. However, we show that even without hidden information there cannot always be a 
budget constraint that sets incentives for the agents to bid their budget truthfully and at the same time is 
in equilibrium for the principal in the first-price sealed-bid auction. In the ascending package auction this 
is easier: the principals can set the budget for the package of two units to zero and the budget constraint 
for the single-unit package equal to the corresponding valuation. However, the principal would need to 
know at least that there is DWE in the market which is already a strong assumption. Still, this provides 
further support for the value of ascending auctions even in an independent private values model. Most IS 
literature on package auctions has focused on ascending auctions and the information feedback provided 
in these auctions  (Adomavicius and Gupta 2005; Bichler et al. 2010; Scheffel et al. 2011). 
Finally, we present some extensions of our model to general second-price sealed-bid package auctions 
mechanism and show that they are outcome equivalent to the ascending package auction in our 
benchmark model of two bidders and two units. Moreover, we demonstrate how the main findings of our 
model help to analyze larger  ×  markets. In the concluding section we provide examples of how the 
model can explain developments in the field. 
The Model 
In our model we consider   ex-ante symmetric firms ,  ∈ 
 = {1,… , }  competing in a multi-object 
package auction for  units  ∈  = {1,… ,} of a homogeneous good. We denote this setting as  ×  
principal-agent package auction model. Let us first outline the auctions, before discussing the payoff 
environment. 
The Auctions 
We focus on different multi-unit package auction formats which allow bidders to submit multiple all-or-
nothing package bids. In multi-unit package auctions, each bidder  ≤  submits an all-or-nothing bid for 
every package. Here, each package is identified by the number of units,  ≤ , it contains. We assume an 
XOR bid language because it is the most general bid language allowing the expression of complements 
and substitutes (Nisan 2006), and it is regularly used in spectrum auctions. After the bidding has ended, 
the risk-neutral auctioneer selects the revenue-maximizing combination of package bids. Due to the XOR 
bidding language, every bidder can win one package at most. The XOR language is the most expressive 
language and it avoids exposure problems for the bidder. For example, a bidder might bid on one and a 
package of two items, but not want to win three items. We assume that the auctioneer has zero reservation 
prices for the units. 
In the first-price sealed-bid (FPSB) package auction, all  bidders simultaneously submit their package 
bids to the auctioneer without knowing the opponents’ bids. The ascending auction is modeled as  iBundle 
(Parkes and Ungar 2000) which is efficient if the bidders reveal their demand correspondence in each 
round, i.e., they bid straightforward. In this auction, bidders observe discriminatory and non-linear prices 
for each package after each round. In each round, every bidder can place bids (reveal demand) on one or 
more packages. After the round, the auctioneer determines the winning allocation. The auction ends if 
there are no new bids. For all bundle bids from bidders not receiving a bundle, the ask price is the last bid 
price plus a minimum bid increment. If every bidder bids on his payoff-maximizing packages in each 
round, then this auction will end in a competitive equilibrium (Bikhchandani and Ostroy 2002).   
We focus on FPSB and ascending package auctions in the paper, however, it is straightforward to analyze 
the VCG mechanism with our model as is done in the Section “Extensions”. The VCG mechanism is the 
extension of the well-known second-price sealed-bid (Vickrey) auction for the sale of a single bundle to 
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any combinatorial auction setting. For our benchmark model we demonstrate equivalence for the optimal 
delegation mechanism between the VCG mechanism and the ascending package auction. 
The Payoff Environment 
Each agent  learns ex-interim package values  ∈  ⊆ 	∀	 ∈  and  is the net present value of 
firm   for the bundle of   units. 5 These values are unknown to the principal. The vector 
  1, … ,  ∈  contains the value draws for all  packages of any agent . Let us define the 
valuation vectors of all agents other than i as  . We assume value draws that are strictly increasing in the 
number of units for any firm :   ′	with	  ′	∀	, ′ ∈ . The values are normalized with 0 
0	∀	 ∈ 
.  
Given the standard symmetry assumption, each firm ’s vector of valuation draws  is a priori distributed 
according to a strictly monotonically increasing joint cumulative distribution function  Ϝ: →  with 
corresponding marginal distribution function for value  of the form &'():	 → . The marginal 
distribution functions &'() and &'*(′), with *   + 1	∀	, * ∈ , have support of ,  with 
    and *, *  with *  * , respectively. The relationship between the different 
supports is   * and   *. 
In every firm  ∈ 
, the principal provides the agent with monetary budget constraint(s) (i.e., budget(s)) 
and the agent places bids in the auction on behalf of the principal. The values of the packages are private 
information to each agent, whereas the corresponding probability distributions are ex ante common 
knowledge among agents participating in the auction. Let agent ’s bid on a bundle of  units be denoted 
by , ∈ 	∀	 ∈  which results in a vector of package bids on all m units of ,  ,1, … , , ∈ -. 
We define the bid vectors of all agents other than i as , . In our principal-agent package auction model 
illustrated in Figure 1, the risk-neutral principal wants to maximize expected profit in which his profit of 
winning any package of  units is given by .   / ,.   
 
Figure 1. Illustration of the principal-agent model of bidding firms 
 
The principal determines a budget constraint for the package of  units of 0, and we refer to the vector 
of all package-dependent budget constraints for any firm  as 0  01, … , 0 ∈ -.  
The agent’s gross utility includes his value-maximizing motives and is modeled by a Bernoulli utility 
function of winning a package of   units 1  2()	with 2: →   being strictly increasing and 
continuous in package value . The agent independently decides on the amount of money bid on each 
package. As long as the payment for a bundle of  units is weakly lower than his respective monetary 
budget constraint of 0, the agent obtains a utility of 2(). Any bid , 3 0 is an unacceptable 
action for him, as he will be fired, for example if payments exceed the budget constraint.  
The overall market with principals, agents, and the auctioneer is modeled as a sequential game of 
incomplete information. From firm  ’s point of view, its opponent’s values and budget constraints 
correspond to unknown random variables, i.e., their types. Furthermore, this game consists of two 
subsequent stages. First, nature determines every agent ’s vector of package valuation draws . In stage 
1, each principal decides on a vector of budget constraints 0  with which to provide his agent. In stage 2, 
                                                           
5 In reality, agents only have estimates of the net present values too, but still, these are more precise estimates of his 
license values. In our model, we assume that the agent has exact information about the firm’s private values ex 
interim, as is customary in most spectrum auction models. 
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agents compete against each other and decide on a vector of bids ,  in the auction. The risk-neutral 
auctioneer selects the revenue maximizing set of packages. We apply backward induction starting at the 
second stage and then continue with the first stage to examine Perfect Bayesian equilibria of this game.  
In our analysis we focus on the principal-agent 2 × 2 package auction model with two bidders and two 
units. This simple market helps to highlight the differences in strategies of principals and agents, and the 
potential contracts necessary to overcome the adverse selection problem that arises.  
The Agency Dilemma 
We first analyze the agents’ equilibrium strategies in stage 2 of the principal-agent 2 × 2 package auction 
model, before we derive equilibria of the profit-maximizing principals. The analysis illustrates the adverse 
selection problem arising between principal and agent.    
Equilibrium Bidding Strategies of the Agent 
In our analysis, we assume the agents do not bid beyond their valuation. This “no overbidding” 
assumption helps us understand the strategic bias of the agent and it is frequently made in the literature 
(Bhawalkar and Roughgarden 2011; Caragiannis et al. 2011; Leme and Tardos 2010; Lucier and Borodin 
2010). It is a reasonable assumption because although the agent (management) does not internalize 
prices in its utility it is very likely to care about the firm not making losses and going bankrupt.6 
Alternatively, one can assume budget constraints that are increasing functions of the package valuations.7 
There will always be some budget constraint such that the agent cannot bid infinity, and the following 
analysis only serves to understand the bias of the agent and how his equilibrium bidding strategy differs 
from that of the principal. Understanding this bias is important for Section „The Limits of Budget 
Constraints“ in which we aim to set optimal budget constraints. We first derive two useful lemmata for 
2 × 		package auctions with two units and  3 1 bidders.  
Lemma 1: It is a weakly dominant action for any agent  to submit a bid in the amount of his valuation 
on the two-unit package in the second stage of the principal-agent 2 ×  FPSB package auction model: 
,2 = 2. 
Proof: For opponents’ fixed bids , , suppose agent  bids strictly less than his valuation on the bundle of 
2 units. Increasing his bid to ,2 = 2 does not reduce the agent’s payoff when winning but strictly 
raises the probability of winning the respective bundle. This comes at the cost of proportionately lowering 
the chances to win the one-unit package. However, as valuations are strictly increasing in the number of 
units, 2 > 1, and the utility function 2∙ is strictly increasing in the package value   the 
smaller package offers less utility than the larger package. Submitting a bid in excess of his valuation on 
the two-unit package cannot be optimal for any agent, as it is an unacceptable action. QED. 
Lemma 1 can be generalized in the following way: Any agent faces the weakly dominant action of 
submitting a bid in the amount of his valuation on the largest package in the second stage of the 
principal-agent  ×  FPSB package auction model. Moreover, it is a weakly dominant strategy for an 
agent to bid his entire valuation if all units of the  ×  FPSB auction are sold as a single package.  
Lemma 2: An agent ’s best response on the one-unit package must either be zero or equal to his 
valuation in the second stage of the principal-agent 2 × 		FPSB package auction model: ,1 ∈
{0, 1}.  
Proof: Any single-unit bid of agent , ,1, from the range of (0, 1] does not affect payoff when 
winning the one-unit bundle. He receives a utility of 21. For his opponents’ fixed bids ,, a bid of 
                                                           
6 One could also assume the principal to be informed about losses ex-post and having to fire the agent in this case. 
7 In this symmetric information environment the agents are restricted by symmetric budgets of 0 = 0() in 
which 0:ℝ → ℝ is a strictly increasing and continuous function in the package value for  units, . Furthermore, we 
define 00 = 0. Note that the “no overbidding” assumption simply corresponds to a special case of these budget 
constraints with 0 =  . The budget constraint is still strictly increasing and continuous in the package 
valuation.  
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,1 = 1	0, however, maximizes (minimizes) the probability of coordinating on the small bundle. It 
thereby minimizes (maximizes) the chances of winning the two-unit package. Any bid from within the 
range of 0, 1 neither maximizes nor minimizes the probability of obtaining the one-unit package and 
therefore cannot be optimal. Again, any bid greater than the valuation is an unacceptable action. QED.  
Lemma 2 can be generalized as follows.: For an agent ’s best response on a package of  units, with 
 <  , it must be true that , ∈ {0, }  in the second stage of the principal-agent  ×   FPSB 
package auction. As in the 2 ×  setting, any bid from the range of (0, 1 cannot be a best response as 
it neither maximizes nor minimizes the probability of winning the respective package and all bids from 
the range of (0, 1] do not affect payoff anyway. 
Note that Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 also hold for the second stage of the principal-agent 2 ×  ascending 
package auction model in a slightly modified way. To use identical notation for both auction formats, let 
us denote the highest package price for  units that bidder  is willing to accept as ,. Then, it is a weakly 
dominant action for any agent  to remain active for the package of two units until its price reaches his 
valuation: ,52 = 2. Furthermore, any agent ’s optimal action for the single-unit package is either to 
not bid on the package at all, or to remain active until he is winning or its price reaches his corresponding 
valuation: ,1 = 1. 
FPSB Package Auction 
With these findings, we can now derive the agents’ equilibrium strategies in both formats of the second 
stage of the principal-agent 2 × 2 package auction model. The analysis of this market is tractable, and the 
same strategic problems can be found in larger markets with more bidders. Our first observation for the 
FPSB package auction is that agents would not coordinate in equilibrium. 
Theorem 1: It is the unique symmetric ex-post equilibrium for any agent  to submit a vector of bids 
, = [0, 2] in the second stage of the principal-agent 2 × 2 FPSB package auction model for any 
vector of package values .  
Proof: According to Lemma 1 and  Lemma 2 it must be true for an agent  that ,2 = 2 and 
,1 ∈ {0, 1}. The same must hold for opponent  correspondingly. WLOG let us first assume the sum 
of both agents’ single-unit valuations always strictly exceeds each agent’s valuation for the package of two 
units. We are now able to construct the following payoff matrix for agent  in Table 1, to determine his 
optimal choice of ,1.   
Payoff matrix for agent 6 
Agent  
,71 = 71 ,71 = 0 
Agent  
,1 = 1 2(1) 2(2) ∙ &8(2) 
,1 = 0 2(2) ∙ &8(2) 2(2) ∙ &8(2) 
 
Table 1. Payoff matrix for agent i in the 9 × 9 FPSB package auction 
 
Suppose both agents submit bids in the amount of their valuations for one unit. Each agent wins a single 
unit, and agent  obtains a utility of 2(1) with certainty. By assumption, the sum of both agents’ 
single-unit package valuations strictly exceeds each agent’s valuation for two units. Now consider all other 
bid combinations in which at least one agent does not bid on the single-unit package. Here, the sum of 
both agents’ single-unit bids cannot exceed each agent’s bid on the bundle of two units. Thus, only the 
agents’ bids on two units compete against each other. Agent  receives a utility of 2(2) only if his 
valuation exceeds opponent ’s valuation: 2 > 72. This occurs with probability &8(2).  
Assume opponent  randomizes for his bid on the single unit between the elements of {0, 71} with some 
fixed probabilities. Using Table 1, agent ’s expected utility of bidding his valuation on one unit exceeds 
the expected utility of not bidding on one unit if inequality (I) holds:  
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2(1) ≥ 2(2) ∙ &8(2) (I) 
Keep in mind that the probabilities cancel out. Note that if 2 = 2, inequality (I) reverses to 
21 < 2̅2	∀	1 ∈ [1, 1] because &82 = 1 and 1 < 2. Moreover, the product of 
2∙ and &8∙ is monotonically increasing in the package value by assumption. Thus, inequality (I) cannot 
hold for any two-unit package value of 2 ∈ <2, 2]  for which <2  is defined by 21 =
2<2 ∙ &8<2. Any agent  with value for two units of 2 > <2  never bids on one unit. 
Similarly, opponent  can only bid his valuation on one unit if he has a valuation of 72 ≤ <2. If this 
condition is not given, then he will not coordinate and inequality (I) cannot hold. Adjusting agent ’s 
beliefs in Table 1 accordingly, his expected utility of bidding his valuation exceeds the expected utility of 
not bidding on one unit if inequality (II) is true in which the probability of agent  winning is now 
conditional on opponent  having a value of 72 ≤ <2: 
21 ≥ 22 ∙ &82|72 ≤ <2 (II) 
Assume agent  to have the threshold package value for two units of 2 = <2, as defined above, and 
some corresponding valuation for one unit of <1. Then, inequality (II) becomes 2<1 ≥ 2<2 
because &8<2|72 ≤ <2 = 1 . This again contradicts the assumption of strictly monotonically 
increasing net present values in the number of units as <1 < <2. As this reasoning is true for any value 
<2 ∈ [2, 2], full shading on one unit is optimal for any vector of valuations .   
Dropping the assumption that the sum of both agents’ single-unit package valuations strictly exceeds each 
agent’s valuation for two units would result in expected utility weakly smaller than 2(1) for agent  if 
both agents submit their single-unit valuations truthfully. As it is not optimal to bid on one unit in the 
case of receiving a utility of 2(1) with certainty, it cannot be optimal if receiving an expected utility 
weakly smaller than 2(1).  Note that in this equilibrium no agent  would want to deviate from his 
equilibrium strategy , = [0, 2] , even if he knew the opponent’s type. Therefore, the proposed 
equilibrium strategy constitutes the unique ex-post equilibrium in the second stage of the principal-agent 
2 × 2 FPSB package auction model. QED. 
Intuitively, any agent ’s opponent j would only be willing to coordinate on one unit if his valuation for two 
units was low. In this case, however, it would be a best response for bidder  not to coordinate, but try to 
win the package of both units independent of both agents’ actual values. We now show that agents do not 
bid on a single unit in the second stage of the principal-agent 2 × 2 ascending package auction model, 
either. 
Ascending Package Auction 
Let us first introduce an adapted definition of straightforward bidding for agents in the second stage of 
the principal-agent 2 × 2 ascending package auction model.  
Definition 1: A straightforward bidding strategy for agents in the second stage of the principal-agent 
 ×  ascending package auction model is defined as follows: an agent begins to bid on the most valuable 
package and remains active until he is overbid. As long as he is winning, he does not bid for a smaller 
package. If he is overbid, he starts to bid for the next smaller package and again remains active until he is 
overbid. This process continues iteratively for all next smaller packages.  
We now employ this definition to proof the following Theorem 2. 
Theorem 2: In the second stage of the principal-agent 2 × 2  ascending package auction model, 
straightforward bidding constitutes an ex-post equilibrium. In this equilibrium the agent with the 
highest valuation for two units does not get active on one unit.  
Proof: Lemma 1 implies that both agents start bidding on the two-unit package immediately and 
remain active until their valuations for two units are reached. According to Lemma 2, each bidder has to 
decide whether to get active on one unit or not. WLOG, assume agent  is the last remaining active bidder 
on the package of two units and suppose he decides to bid for the single unit. If opponent  gets active on 
this unit as well the sum of both agents’ single-unit prices might eventually exceed bidder ’s valuation for 
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two units. This cannot happen if agent  does not bid on one unit and therefore it is a weakly dominant 
action for bidder  not to get active on the single unit. Remember, agent  strictly prefers two units to one 
unit. Given this behavior, opponent  is in fact indifferent between becoming active and not bidding on the 
single-unit package, as he cannot win anyway.  
Even knowing the opponent’s type, no agent can benefit by deviating from his equilibrium strategy. Thus, 
straightforward bidding constitutes an ex-post equilibrium in the second stage of the principal-agent 
2 × 2 ascending package auction model. QED. 
Similar to Theorem 1 of the FPSB package auction, Theorem 2 describes an ex-post equilibrium that is 
robust against risk aversion8. In both auction formats, agents never coordinate on winning one unit each. 
Moreover, this result is completely independent of the efficiency environment. The analysis shows that in 
the second stage of the principal-agent 2 × 2 package auction model, agents will bid their valuation on 
the large package and nothing on the smaller package in equilibrium. Let us now focus on the principals’ 
bidding behavior by abstracting from the agents. 
Equilibrium Bidding Strategies of the Principal 
In this subsection, we analyze how a quasilinear principal would bid in equilibrium if he had perfect 
knowledge about his firm’s valuations and prior type distributions. This will provide a baseline to 
compare the strategies of the agent against. Unfortunately, there is no closed-form equilibrium bid 
function for package auctions. However, we derive conditions under which profit-maximizing principals 
prefer to coordinate on winning one unit each (dual-winner outcome) in the 2 × 2 package auction, 
assuming bidders have public information about DWE. With DWE, it is always efficient to have the dual-
winner outcome: 1 + 71 − >?@2, 72A > 0  for all 1, 71 ∈ [1, 1] and 2, 72 ∈
[2, 2]. The inequality ̅2 < 2 ∙ 1 ensures DWE, independent from the realization of valuations. 
This environment is strategically interesting because bidders need to coordinate on the efficient solution. 
With this assumption, we can derive Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies similar to earlier work on split-
award auctions (Anton and Yao 1992).  
Theorem 3 and Theorem 6 show that a dual-winner outcome can be supported as equilibrium for all 
possible valuations 1, 71 ∈ [1, 1]  and 2, 72 ∈ [2, 2]  in the case of DWE in the 
FPSB and ascending package auction, respectively. Theorem 4 and Theorem 7 derive conditions under 
which the single-winner outcome constitutes an equilibrium for all possible valuations 1, 71 ∈
[1, 1] and 2, 72 ∈ [2, 2] in DWE. We refer to these two types of equilibria as dual-
winner equilibrium and single-winner equilibrium, respectively. Finally, Theorem 5 and Theorem 8 
establish equilibrium selection criteria for both auction formats in terms of payoff dominance. 
FPSB Package Auction 
We assume quasilinear bidders (the principals) to be symmetric, and bidder ’s optimal bid on a bundle of 
  units ,  is a strictly increasing and continuous function in his valuation for this package : 
, = ,().  
Theorem 3: Any bidder ’s vector of bids , = [,1, ,2] is a symmetric dual-winner equilibrium in a 
2 × 2 FPSB package auction if the following conditions hold:  
(1.)  2 < 2 ∙ 1 
(2.) ,1 is constant over 1 ∈ [1, 1] and denoted by ,1 = ,1 for all  ∈ 
 
(3.) ,1 ∈ [2 − 1, 1] 
                                                           
8 We refer to risk aversion as is implied by a concave utility function 2∙ over possible outcomes of the auction 
(lottery) {0, 1, 2} for some agent . Regarding Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 one could expect this risk averse 
agent to prefer the certain dual-winner outcome with utility of 2(1) over the lottery of winning the single-winner 
outcome with utility of 2(2) ∙ &8(2) and not winning at all.  
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(4.) ,2  2 ∙ ,1 
(5.) B2, ,1 ≤ ,2 for all 2 ∈ [2, 2] and all  ∈ 
 
The proofs for Theorems 3, 4, and 5 have several pages and needed to be skipped to fit the page 
restrictions of the conference proceedings. These proofs draw on techniques developed by Anton and Yao 
(1992), but are independent of a publicly known efficiency parameter. First, condition (1.) ensures DWE. 
Second, according to condition (2.) both bidders pool at a constant single-unit bid of ,1 out of its range 
from condition (3.). Third, condition (4.) ensures that the auctioneer always selects the dual-winner 
outcome in equilibrium. Finally, note that condition (5.) restrains any bidder ’s equilibrium bidding 
function for two units. It is not allowed to fall below the lower bound of B2, ,1 in order to support 
the pooling bid for one unit. The lower bound is defined as follows:  
B(2, ,1) ≡ ,1 +
,1 − 1 ∙ (1 − &82)
&8(2)
 
This restriction ensures that winning the double-unit package is less profitable in expectation than 
obtaining a single unit in equilibrium. For our analysis we focus on the lowest pooling bid for one unit of 
,1 = 2 − 1. This maximizes the utility of both bidders and therefore serves as a natural focal point 
for implicit coordination in the dual-winner equilibrium. Let us next characterize the single-winner 
equilibrium.  
Theorem 4: Any bidder ’s vector of bids , = [,1, ,2] is a symmetric single-winner equilibrium in 
the 2 × 2 FPSB package auction if the following conditions hold:  
(1.)  ,2 = 2 − &82D ∙ E &8 F72G ∙ H72IJ8I8  
(2.) ,(1) ∈ [0, (2) − (1)) 
The equilibrium bid on the double-unit package in the single-winner equilibrium of the 2 × 2 FPSB 
package auction from condition (1.) corresponds to the equilibrium strategy of the well-known standard 
FPSB auction in which two units are sold as the sole package to two bidders. Condition (2.) ensures any 
bidder can enforce the single-winner equilibrium by bidding low enough on one unit to make the dual-
winner outcome unprofitable for the opponent.  
Let us now examine when principals prefer to coordinate on the dual-winner equilibrium rather than 
select the single-winner equilibrium.  
Theorem 5: Any principal  prefers the dual-winner equilibrium to the single-winner equilibrium in the 
2 × 2 FPSB package auction if 2 ∙ ,(1) < K F7(2)G is true.  
Intuitively, the expected double-unit valuation exceeds twice the pooling bid if the probability for high 
double-unit value draws is high enough. If high-value draws for the package of two units are very likely, 
however, any bidder prefers the dual-winner equilibrium to the single-winner equilibrium because he is 
likely to lose in the latter equilibrium. Let us now turn to the analysis of the principals’ optimal bidding 
behavior in the 2 × 2 ascending package auction. 
Ascending Package Auction 
We start with the characterization of the dual-winner equilibrium. 
Theorem 6: In a symmetric ex-post dual-winner equilibrium of the 2 × 2 ascending package auction, 
both bidders get active on the single-unit package until the price reaches their valuations and do not bid 
on the package of two units.  
Proof: If both bidders follow the proposed equilibrium strategy there is no over-demand, and the auction 
immediately stops at a price of zero for the package of one unit. Any bidder  receives equilibrium profit of 
(1) with certainty. In the remaining proof, we assume opponent  follows this proposed equilibrium 
strategy.  
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First, suppose principal i tries to win one unit, but does not immediately drop out from bidding on the 
double-unit package. Now the sum of both players’ prices for one unit has to exceed bidder ’s price for 
two units. This cannot be optimal because any player  has to pay a positive price for one unit. His profit is 
decreased strictly below equilibrium profit of (1).   
Second, assume principal  tries to win two units and suppose he does not bid on the single unit. If player  
wins two units at a price of 7(1), he obtains a profit of (2) − 7(1). Under DWE the equilibrium profit of 
(1) strictly exceeds (2) − 7(1). Now, let bidder  also bid on the package of one unit. This cannot 
possibly raise ’s profit on two units compared to not bidding on one unit. Finally, note that the proposed 
equilibrium strategy is independent of any bidder’s package valuations and therefore constitutes a 
symmetric ex-post equilibrium. QED. 
There is also a single-winner equilibrium in the 2 × 2 ascending package auction.  
Theorem 7: In a symmetric ex-post single-winner equilibrium of the 2 × 2 ascending package auction, 
any bidder  remains active on the single-unit package as long as its price is strictly below (2) − (1) 
and continues to bid on the package of two units until the respective price reaches his valuation of (2).  
Proof: Suppose opponent  follows the proposed equilibrium strategy from Theorem 7. Bidder  has no 
chance to profitably enforce the dual-winner outcome because opponent  does in fact use his “veto” bid, 
given (2) > (1) is true. The reasoning is analogue to the proof of Theorem 4 and therefore omitted. 
Bidder  is indifferent between submitting any single-unit bid of L(1) ∈ [0, (1)] as long as he continues 
to be active on the large bundle until the price reaches his corresponding value of (2). He obtains an 
expected profit of &8((2)) ∙ ((2) − 7(2)). Bidder   has the highest double-unit package value with 
probability of &8((2)). In this case, he wins two units at a price of the second highest value, 7(2), and 
receives a profit of (2) − 7(2). However, if bidder  decides to drop out on two units before the price 
reaches his value of (2), he strictly lowers his probability of winning. This strictly decreases his expected 
profit and cannot be optimal.  
In the single-winner equilibrium, by symmetry, both bidders quit bidding on one unit before its price 
reaches (2) − (1) and remain active on the package of two units until its price reaches their respective 
valuations. The proposed equilibrium strategies are independent of the bidders’ actual package valuations 
and therefore are rationalizable ex-post. QED.   
Similar to the 2 × 2 FPSB package auction, the equilibrium bidding for the double-unit package in the 
single-winner equilibrium of the 2 × 2  ascending package auction corresponds to the equilibrium 
strategy of the well-known standard ascending (English) auction in which two units are sold as the sole 
package to two bidders. Again, any bidder can enforce the single-winner equilibrium by making the dual-
winner outcome unprofitable for the opponent. However, the dual-winner equilibrium always strictly 
dominates the single-winner equilibrium in profit.  
Theorem 8: Any bidder  strictly prefers the dual-winner equilibrium to the single-winner equilibrium 
in the 2 × 2 ascending package auction in DWE.  
Proof: In the dual-winner equilibrium from Theorem 6, the bidder with the lowest value for one unit 
obtains the lowest profit of (1) with certainty. According to Theorem 7, the highest possible profit 
achievable in the single-winner equilibrium is (2) − (2). Using the definition of dual-winner efficiency 
and the fact that (2) > (1), the lowest obtainable profit in the dual-winner equilibrium strictly exceeds 
the highest possible profit in the single-winner equilibrium. Therefore, profit in the dual-winner 
equilibrium is strictly greater than in the single-winner equilibrium for all possible bidders’ valuations 
(1), 7(1) ∈ [(1), (1)] and (2) ∈ [(2), (2)]. QED. 
In the dual-winner equilibrium of the 2 × 2 FPSB package auction from Theorem 3 both bidders 
submit pooling prices for one unit and high veto-bids for two units that make the single-winner outcome 
unprofitable. In the ascending counterpart in Theorem 6 both bidders only get active on one unit each 
and win at a prize of zero. The single-winner equilibrium of the 2 × 2 FPSB package auction from 
Theorem 4 involves a low veto-bid on one unit that makes the dual-winner outcome unprofitable and an 
optimal bid on two units. Similarly, in Theorem 7 in the ascending format both bidders submit high 
veto-bids on one unit to make the single-winner outcome more desirable. Due to the specific form of the 
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dual-winner equilibrium in the 2 × 2 ascending package auction Theorem 8 shows that it strictly 
dominates in payoff whereas in the FPSB format principals face an equilibrium selection problem as 
described in Theorem 5.  
There is an additional reason why the dual-winner equilibrium serves as a natural focal point in the 2 × 2 
ascending package auction. Bidders can observe their opponents’ equilibrium choices and adjust 
accordingly. Especially, the nature of the dual-winner equilibrium as defined in Theorem 6 allows a 
bidder to start aiming for one unit and adjust to the single-winner equilibrium from Theorem 7 if he 
discovers his opponent aims for two units. To illustrate the last point, suppose bidder  plays the dual-
winner equilibrium and let opponent  chose the single-winner equilibrium. As all package prices are 
publicly observable, bidder  is able to recognize that his opponent is playing a different equilibrium and 
can adjust his own equilibrium strategy to the single-winner equilibrium. Although neither bidder 
overcame the equilibrium selection problem in the beginning, they are able to coordinate on the single-
winner equilibrium in the end. 
In general, the agents’ equilibrium behavior of not bidding on one unit leads to a conflict of interest with 
the principals’ dual-winner equilibrium. In the next section, we discuss how to overcome this conflict via 
budget constraints in the symmetric information setting. 
The Limits of Budget Constraints 
Let us now analyze if a principal could set budget constraints in the FPSB package auction, so that the 
agent implements his strategy. The focus on budget constraints is well motivated by the extensive 
literature on this subject in auctions. In this subsection, we still assume that the supports of the prior 
distributions and the value draws are known to the principals, and we show that even then, budget 
constraints can be insufficient to implement the principal’s equilibrium bidding strategy in the first-price 
auction with an agent. 
FPSB Package Auction 
So far, we assumed agent ’s package budget constraint, 0(), to be an increasing function of the package 
value. However, agents would not bid on a single-unit package in equilibrium with these types of budget 
constraints.9 We will therefore analyze budget constraints of the form 0M(2) < 0(1) in which the principal 
restricts the budget for two units to be strictly smaller than the single-unit budget. In case of the “no 
overbidding” assumption, this would imply an agent   to be allowed only to bid up to a proxy value, M(2), 
strictly smaller than his true valuation (2): M(2) < (2). In the general budget constraint notation the 
principal defines a proxy value M(2) ∈ N(2), (2)O as an upper bound and assigns a respective budget 
constraint of 0(M(2)), so that the final budget constraint for the agent is given by 0(M(2)) = 0M(2).  
Theorem 9: A principal  can direct his agent on the dual-winner outcome in the second stage of the 
principal-agent 2 × 2  FPSB package auction model by assigning him package-dependent budget 
constraints of the form 0 = [0(1), 0M(2)], with 0(1) = 0((1), 0M(2) = 0(M(2)) and 0M(2) < 0(1) that 
satisfy the following two conditions (I) and (II): 
(1.) 0((1)) + 0 F(1)G ≥ 0(M(2)) 
(2.) 2((1)) ≥ 2((2)) ∙ &D(M(2))   
Proof: Assume both agents follow their equilibrium strategy of submitting their budget of 0(1) for the 
single-unit package. They win the dual-winner outcome with certainty if the sum of both single-unit bids 
exceeds each agent’s double-unit bid. Remember from Lemma 1 that any agent always spends his entire 
                                                           
9 It is straightforward to show that under the more general notation of budget constraints, 0() = 0(()), as defined 
in footnote 6, Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 hold with single- and double-unit package budgets of the form 0(1) ≤
0(2). According to Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 the agent submits a double-unit package bid of ,(2) = 0(2) and a 
single-unit package bid of ,(1) ∈ {0, 0(1)}, respectively.  
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double-unit budget constraint. And according to Lemma 2 if an agent submits a non-zero bid on one 
unit, he must bid his entire single-unit budget constraint.   
In this equilibrium, any agent  pays his single-unit budget constraint, 0(1), for sure and therefore his 
principal provides him with an optimal budget of 0(1) = 0((1)). In addition, the principal must chose a 
weakly reduced double-unit budget constraint 0(2) = 0(M(2))  of the form 0(M(2)) ≤ 0((2))  with 
proxy valuation M(2) ≤ (2), so that condition (1.) is satisfied. Principal  does not know firm ’s package 
value for one unit and therefore has to make sure his choice of the weakly reduced two-unit budget 
constraint 0(M(2)) is below the sum of both single-unit budget constraints. This has to be true for all 
possible single-unit budget constraints of his opponent, especially the smallest budget constraint of 
0((1)). By symmetry, opponent  follows the same strategy and condition (1.) does in fact guarantee 
each agent will obtain the small package with certainty. 
For agent  to be incentivized to bid on one unit, his utility from the dual-winner outcome must exceed his 
expected utility from the single-winner outcome. This is ensured in the incentive compatibility condition 
(2.). The RHS represents agent i’s expected payoff from the single-winner outcome when not bidding on 
one unit. Here, &D(M(2)) is the probability with which his weakly reduced double-unit budget constraint, 
0(M(2)), exceeds opponent  ’s single-unit budget constraint 0(7(1)) . Remember that opponent   is 
provided with budgets of 0M7(2) < 0(1). The proxy value M(2) is chosen so that &D(M(2)) is low enough for 
the RHS to be lower than the LHS and the incentive compatibility condition satisfied. QED.  
Following backward induction, we need to analyze whether the budget constraint scheme from Theorem 
9 actually permits the implementation of the principals’ dual-winner equilibrium. In other words, we 
need to understand when these budget constraints violate the principals’ equilibrium bid functions from 
Theorem 3. In Theorem 10, we derive a condition under which the principals cannot direct their 
agents on truthfully revealing their profit-maximizing equilibrium strategies.   
Theorem 10: There is no vector of budget constraints 0 = [0(1), 0M(2)] that constitutes a Perfect 
Bayesian Equilibrium for the principal-agent 2 × 2 FPSB package auction model under DWE in which 
the principal implements his dual-winner equilibrium strategies if inequality  2 ∙ F(2) − (1)G > (1) is 
true. 
Proof: In Theorem 3, every principal chooses the same pooling price of ,(1) in the dual-winner 
equilibrium. Thus, according to Theorem 9, any principal  has to provide his agent with the same 
single-unit budget constraint in height of the pooling bid: 0((1)) = ,(1)	∀	 ∈ 
. Moreover, any principal 
 must select a weakly reduced double-unit budget constraint that corresponds to his equilibrium bid on 
two units:	0(M2)  ,2. Due to Lemma 1, every agent always truthfully bids his entire weakly 
reduced double-unit budget constraint for two units 0(M2). The following three conditions (I) to (III) 
then have to be satisfied: 
2 ∙ ,1) ≥ 0(M(2)) (I) 
0(M(2)) ≥ B((2), ,(1))	 (II) 
21)) ≥ 2((2)) ∙ &D(M(2))	 (III) 
Condition (I) ensures that the auctioneer will choose the dual-winner outcome in equilibrium and 
corresponds to condition (1.) from Theorem 9. The last two conditions (II) and (III) ensure that no 
deviation from obtaining the single-unit package will be profitable for principal and agent in equilibrium. 
They correspond to conditions (5.) from Theorem 3 and (2.) from Theorem 9, respectively. Let us 
now check whether the above three conditions can be satisfied for the focal point pooling bid of ,1) =
(2) − (1). Suppose firm  has the highest possible value for the package of two units (2) = (2). In 
this case, condition (II) becomes (II’) by definition of B((2), ,(1)):   
0(M(2)) ≥ 2 ∙ ((2) − (1))	 (II’) 
Given Theorem 2 (4.), for a package value of 2  2 it must be true that ,2  2 ∙ 2 /
1)). Agent ’s bid on two units equals twice the pooling bid. Remember, principal  chooses a double-
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unit package budget constraint in the amount of his respective equilibrium bid: 0(M(2)) = ,((2)). This 
implies 0(M(2)) = 2 ∙ ((2) − (1)) which satisfies condition (I) and forces condition (II’) to hold with 
equality. Moreover, note that condition (III) implies M(2) ≤ (1) because (1) is the highest possible 
value in the support of &D(∙).  Applying this insight to the assumption of 0(M(2)) ≤ M(2)  we obtain 
condition (III’):  
0(M(2)) ≤ (1) (III’) 
Finally, combining conditions (II’) and (III’) is not possible if condition 2 ∙ F(2) − (1)G > (1) is true. 
In this case, any firm  with package value of (2) = (2) cannot implement budget constraints that 
satisfy two restrictions: they correspond to its principal’s equilibrium strategy and at the same time direct 
its agent to bid truthfully on both packages. Hence, the dual-winner equilibrium cannot be supported as a 
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the principal-agent 2 × 2 FPSB package auction model. QED.  
It follows that a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which principal and agent are incentive aligned, cannot 
always exist. Intuitively, any firm faces the following trade-off: the principal has to bid high enough on 
two units to prohibit him from making a profit by deviating from the dual-winner equilibrium and 
winning. The agent can only be directed on bidding for one unit if his budget constraint on the double-
unit package is low enough. Consequently, both requirements cannot always be met simultaneously by the 
budget constraints. In such a case, the principals cannot enforce the dual-winner equilibrium. 
Ascending Package Auction 
Unlike its sealed-bid counterpart, the principals’ dual-winner equilibrium can easily be implemented as a 
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the principal-agent 2 × 2 ascending package auction model.  
Theorem 11: The vector of budget constraints 0 = [0(1), 0M(2)], with 0(1) = (1) and 0M(2) = 0 , 
constitutes a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium for the principal-agent 2 × 2  ascending package auction 
model in which any principal  implements the dual-winner equilibrium.   
Proof: In Theorem 6, any principal  does not bid on the package of two units and remains active on the 
package of one unit until the price reaches his corresponding valuation of (1). To implement the 
principal’s dual-winner equilibrium strategy for his agent, the principal provides a zero budget constraint 
on the large package. This eliminates the agent’s possibility to win the double-unit package and he is in 
fact competing in a package auction that consists solely of one unit. As a consequence of Lemma 1, the 
agent then truthfully bids up to his budget constraint for the single-unit package and the principal can 
simply provide his agent with a budget constraint in the amount of his valuation for one unit. QED. 
In summary, the principal can always set budgets in the form of 0 = [0(1), 0M(2)], with 0(1) = (1) and 
0M(2) = 0 to implement his dual-winner equilibrium in the 2 × 2 ascending package auction model. In its 
sealed-bid counterpart, budget constraints of 0 = [0(1), 0M(2)]  with 0((1)) = ,(1)  and 0(M(2)) =
,((2)) as defined in Theorem 3 only implement the dual-winner equilibrium if 2 ∙ F(2) − (1)G ≤
(1) is true. The nature of the dual-winner equilibrium in the 2 × 2 ascending package auction allow for 
the optimal delegation with budgets to solve the adverse selection problem. The difficulty to set budget 
constraints in equilibrium in the first-price package auction is an argument for the ascending auctions in 
our model that is different to traditional arguments for ascending auctions such as the linkage principle 
(Milgrom and Weber 1982). 
Extensions 
In this section, we first demonstrate how our benchmark principal-agent 2 × 2 package auction model 
can be used to analyze general second-price sealed-bid auction mechanisms. We then extend our findings 
to larger  ×  markets.  
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Second-Price Mechanisms  
 The VCG mechanism is the generalization of the well-known second-price sealed-bid (Vickrey) auction to 
combinatorial package auctions. The VCG mechanism is composed of the Clarke Pivot payment rule that 
is strategy proof for profit-maximizing bidders (principals) and incentivizes the bidders to truthfully 
report their package valuations. The VCG mechanism further contains an allocation rule that allocates the 
package of items with the sum of highest reports to the corresponding bidders and therefore achieves 
welfare-maximization.  
Ignoring the agents in the second stage of our principal-agent 2 × 2 VCG package auction model, the 
VCG mechanism implements the dual-winner outcome for the principals in the DWE setting. The 
payment rule forces the principals to truthfully reveal their package valuations and DWE guarantees the 
allocation rule to select the dual-winner outcome. In the second stage of the principal-agent 2 × 2 VCG 
package auction model the payment rule does not affect the agents by definition. Thus, their optimal 
reporting strategy in the VCG mechanism corresponds to the equilibrium from the second stage of the 
principal-agent 2 × 2 FPSB package auction model described in Theorem 1. By a similar logic as in 
Theorem 11 the principals can then provide their agents with the same optimal budgets to implement 
the strategy-proof and welfare-maximizing dual-winner outcome as a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the 
principal-agent 2 × 2 VCG package auction model. 
In summary, the VCG mechanism is outcome equivalent to the ascending auction in our principal-agent 
2 × 2 package auction model. As an advantage it does not result in an equilibrium selection problem for 
the principals, although this selection problem is very weak in the ascending format anyway. However, 
note that the VCG mechanism is hardly used in practice at all.  
Larger Markets 
The results for 2 × 2	markets depend on the power of each bidder to veto a split. In more complex  ×  
environments this veto-power can either be strong or weak. Suppose, for example, the number of units 
strictly exceeds the number of bidders. In this setting, individual bidders’ veto-power against “splitting” 
allocations might still be strong and coordination hard to achieve. Here, our results from the 2 × 2 market 
will extend wlog to larger  ×  auctions.   
Now assume the number of bidders strictly exceeds the number of units. Each bidder’s veto-power against 
“splitting” allocations is low. The higher the number of bidders compared to the number of units, the 
more likely at least some of them will coordinate. To demonstrate this point let us focus on the second 
stage of the principal agent 2 ×  ascending package auction model under DWE. Making use of the “no-
overbidding” assumption there is an ex-post equilibrium in which all agents bid on one unit and the two 
bidders with the highest valuation for the singleton win one unit each. Unlike Theorem 2 all but the 
bidder with the highest valuation for the double-unit package let the price for one unit rise until they 
overbid the other bidder on two units (under DWE this must eventually happen). The latter will then also 
start bidding on one unit. Given the other bidders coordinate, any one bidder will certainly lose if he does 
not participate. 
However, ignoring this technical example (that crucially depends on DWE and two units) any individual 
bidder can never be entirely certain about his competitors’ willingness to coordinate. Hence, Bayesian 
Nash Equilibria in which bidders do not coordinate can still be supported with appropriate believes and 
the fundamental trade-offs described in the principal-agent 2 × 2 package auction model remain valid. 
As an example, we now focus on the optimal principal strategy in the 2 ×  FPSB package auction under 
DWE. Suppose all opponents employ a veto strategy as defined in Theorem 4 (2.) to exclude the dual-
winner outcome and try to win the large package. In this case, any one bidder cannot win a single unit as 
it is blocked by his opponents’ veto strategies. Thus, he has to participate in the dual-winner equilibrium 
too. Regarding the agents in the second stage of the principal-agent 2 ×  FPSB package auction model, 
especially bidders with high valuations for the large package might try to use their veto-power against 
“splitting” allocations in order to win larger bundles on their own.   
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Conclusions 
In summary, the information asymmetries in bidding firms can make it very difficult for principals to 
incentivize the agents. This has implications for auctioneers and their choice of auction format as well. 
There is an ongoing policy discussion about sealed-bid vs. ascending package auctions. For example, in a 
spectrum auction in Norway in 2014, the allocation of a FPSB combinatorial auction was such that some 
items remained unsold, whereas one incumbent did not win sufficient spectrum and had to leave the 
market later. There can be many reasons for such an outcome. However, our analysis suggests that 
principal-agent relationships can be an important reason why bidders do not coordinate in a FPSB 
package auction. For a principal, it is easier to direct his agent to coordination in an ascending auction as 
compared to a FPSB auction. If principals cannot set budget constraints appropriately, there is a danger 
that agents will overbid and that they will not bid on smaller packages, even in situations in which this is 
payoff-maximal for the firm. While auctions are usually described as a mechanism to achieve high 
efficiency, we have shown that this is not necessarily the case anymore with principal-agent relationships 
in the bidding firm. 
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